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Appreciation and Dividends
By L. L. Briggs

Although American and English court decisions on the subject
date back for more than a quarter of a century, the legal status of
appreciation of a corporation’s assets as a source of dividends was
not brought to the attention of the general public until 1928 and
1929 when many investment trusts were considering the declara
tion of dividends on the basis of increases in value of their securi
ties, which had resulted from the long upward trend in the stock
market. Since the treatment of appreciation is an important
unsettled point in the determination of surplus available for
dividends I have thought it worth while to bring together the
leading court decisions and the few statutes that have a bearing
on the subject.
The courts of England and the United States have been uniform
in holding that realized appreciation resulting from the sale of
fixed assets is surplus which is available for dividends. First
let us review a few of the English decisions. In an early case,
Robinson v. Ashton (1875) 20 Eq. 28, the issue before the court
was whether or not a partner was entitled to half of the profit
arising from the sale of a mill. Sir George Jessel, master of the
rolls, held that as there was no special agreement, the mill was
an asset of the partnership, and, since the selling price was in
excess of the book value, the difference was profit and was d i visible
between the partners in their profit-and-loss sharing ratio. In
Lubbock v. British Bank of South America (1892) 2 Ch. 198, the
court decided that profit realized on the sale of a bank building
was a proper source of dividends. According to the court in
Foster v. New Trinidad Lake Asphalte Company (1901) 1 Ch.
208:
“. . .an appreciation in total value of capital assets, if duly realized by sale
or getting in of some portion of such assets, may, in a proper case, be treated
as available for purposes of dividend.”

One of the late decisions is that of Cross v. Imperial Continental
Gas Association (1923) L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 553. In this case the
defendant sold corporation property at an increase of about
$7,500,000 over book value, out of which it was proposed to pay
a dividend amounting to approximately $1,000,000. The deben
ture stockholders objected on the ground that the statute pro29
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hibited dividends from capital gains. The court held that the
dividends were legal.
Now, let us consider the American cases in point. In People v.
Sohmer (1913) 143 N. Y. S. 313, a corporation leased a building
for $200,000. Later, when the property became more valuable,
the company sold the lease for $1,050,000 and paid $850,000 to
its stockholders in dividends. In his opinion, Justice Lyon said:
“ The sum $850,000 was no part of the capital but was the product of capital.
It was derived from an increase in the value of the assets of the company. It
represented the profits of the realtor upon its lease, and its division among the
stockholders constituted a dividend from surplus profits.”

People ex rel Queen's County Water Company v. Travis (1916)
171 App. Div. (N. Y.) 521 is a case in which a water company
purchased land that it subsequently sold at a profit and distrib
uted this gain as a dividend. The court held that the realized
capital appreciation was available for such a purpose and said:
“ ... It is immaterial, therefore, whether the water company made these
profits by selling water or selling land.”

In Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Union Pacific Railroad
Company (1914) 212 N. Y. 360, the defendant company had made
a profit of more than $58,000,000 by the purchase and sale of stock
of another corporation and had declared a dividend partly upon
the basis of this profit. A holder of preferred stock attempted to
restrain payment of the dividend. Justice Hiscock said:
“ Ordinarily the profits made by a corporation on the purchase and sale of
property would so clearly belong to a fund applicable to the payment of divi
dends that there would be no debate about it. ... I think it is abundantly
established by decisions which are in conformity with and fortified by com
mercial understanding and experience that the gains or profits realized by a
corporation at least from its active transactions such as those under considera
tion here constitute profits and surplus which are available for dividends.”

According to 7 Ruling Case Law, section 261:
“ An appreciation in value of assets may be taken into account in determining
whether or not a profit has been made, and may be distributed as dividends in
the same manner as profits arising from earnings, where such appreciation
has been actually realized.”

Although there is considerable confusion among the decisions
on the subject, most of the courts of the United States have held
that unrealized appreciation of asset values is not available for
dividends. In Jennery v. Olmstead (1885) 36 Hun. 536, the issue
was whether a savings bank had made a profit from which the
salary of the president could be paid. The president contended
that the difference between the purchase price and market value of
30
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certain government bonds then owned by the bank should be
called profits. Justice Peckham answered the contention in this
way:
“ It is not a proper way to ascertain the fact of profits to estimate the value
of bonds yet unsold and upon finding the estimated value to exceed the price
paid, to call the difference profits. It is not profits in any true sense of that
term. If the bonds were actually sold at such price, the transaction would then
be completed and the profits actually realized instead of merely estimated.
. . . It is claimed that the profits are substantially realized by this appreciation
in the value of government bonds, if the bonds are unsold, just as much as if
they were sold. If unsold, it is said that the value of the bond is as well known
by a simple reference to the reports of the stock market as it would be by an
actual sale, and that if sold, all that is got in exchange is another article, whose
value may also fluctuate from time to time, and hence there is no sense in
demanding an actual sale of the bond before asserting a realization of a profit.
Nevertheless the bond unsold is only worth so many dollars, according to the
market price thereof, whereas the bond when sold has actually brought so
many dollars, and the dollars are in money, made so by law, and that money
is now on hand.”

In Kingston v. Home Life Insurance Company (1917) 11 Del.
Ch. 258, it was held that surplus resulting from the estimated
appreciation in the value of land purchased with corporate capital
was not available for dividend purposes. The directors revalued
part of the company’s property and added $15,000 to a building
account with a corresponding credit to surplus. In his opinion,
the chancellor said:
“ Some things seem clear even to me, and one is that an estimated increase
in the value of the building owned by the insurance company and occupied by
its officers and employees, however accurately the increase be estimated, is not
a net profit arising from the business of the company. If it is an investment of
capital of the company its increased value when realized by a sale may perhaps
be treated as a profit but until realized it is surely unwise, inaccurate and wrong
to so regard it and pay out money based on such an estimate, for it is only a
guess, and if a correct one it may become incorrect later when the conditions
which produced the estimated increase of value change.”

Hill v. International Products Company (1925) 220 N. Y. S. 711
is a case in which the company paid a dividend based upon surplus
resulting from an estimated increase in the size and weight of
cattle owned by a department of the corporation. Justice
Mahoney said:
“ It would seem to me that this alleged in value of cattle not realized by an
actual sale of cattle is not a proper item to be taken into consideration in
determining the actual surplus of a going concern.”

In Wilson v. Barnett, a case reported in New York “Law Jour
nal” of August 2, 1928, corporate directors declared a preferred
stock dividend from surplus which came from a reappraisal of an
old hotel site. The receiver of the company sued the directors
and the court held them personally liable for the amount of the
31
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dividend. Justice Baugh, in Dealers' Granite Corporation v.
Faubion (1929) 18 S. W. (2d) 737, stated the principle in these
words:
"... And the general rule seems to be that increase in the value of lands held
by a corporation cannot be considered profits, at least until such lands are
sold and the profits actually realized.”

In Southern California Home Builders v. Young (1920) 188 P.
585, the directors paid three dividends on the basis of statements
prepared by bookkeepers of the company, appraisals of corpora
tion property, and the certificate of a certified public accountant.
The plaintiff brought an action against the directors of the cor
poration on the ground that the appraisal value was inflated and
that, as a result, the dividends were not legitimate since they were
from capital. Justice Brittain, in giving judgment for the plain
tiff, made the following statement:
“ Mere advance in value of property prior to its sale or estimated profits on
partially executed contracts, do not constitute profits, because the fluctuations
of the market . . . may bring about a condition such as was found in the present
case where the estimated profits were in fact liabilities or direct losses.”

Marks v. Monroe County Permanent Savings and Loan Associa
tion (1889) 22 N. Y. S. 589 is a case in which the defendant asso
ciation lent money to its members on bond and mortgage. The
member would give a mortgage for a certain amount and would
receive that amount less discount at a given per cent. for the time
specified in the contract. An example given in the case was that
of the association paying a borrower $495 cash for a mortgage of
$525. The issue before the court was whether the discount was
available for dividends. In his opinion, Justice Ramsey said:
"... But I do not think the profit can be said to be earned until the trans
action is closed and the money is in the treasury. Until that is done there may
be no profits. The failure to pay may make the asset worthless. This
distinction between the gain by the appreciation in value of an asset, and the
final gain of money in hand by its sale at an enhanced value, is taken and made
the rule of the decision in Jennery v. Olmstead. ... I think the holding of the
court in that case, that profits are not realized because the value of the assets
is enhanced, is controlling here against the plaintiff.”

In Moore v. Murchison (1915) 226 Fed. 679, Mrs. Moore paid
$7,800 for assets that were inventoried at more than $15,000. A
corporation was organized and Mrs. Moore turned these assets
over to it for 78 shares of common stock with a par value of $100 a
share. The directors entered the assets on the books at their
face value, thereby creating a surplus from which they declared a
dividend. The company later became bankrupt and the trustees
32
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sued the directors. The court held them personally liable for the
full amount of the dividends. According to the facts of Hastings
v. International Paper Company, 187 App. Div. (N. Y.) 404, the
inventoried goods of the defendant corporation had increased in
value during the previous two years and these assets had been
placed on the balance-sheet at the appreciated value. In regard
to this appreciation, the court said:
“This sum of $18,869,666.88 does not represent actual profits, as the mate
rials have not been turned into money. Moreover, the apparent large profits
may pass into the air on a falling market.”

In Coleman v. Booth (1916) 268 Mo. 64, the company wrote up
the value of its goodwill in order to show a surplus against which a
dividend might be declared and justified the reappraisal on the
ground of the corporation’s high earning power. The court con
demned this procedure and held the directors liable for the divi
dends declared. The court apparently thought that the increase
in goodwill as indicated by the write-up did not exist.
Next, let us review cases in which unrealized appreciation of
assets apparently has been sanctioned as a source of dividend.
Hutchinson v. Curtis (1904) 92 N. Y. S. 70 is a case involving the
American Malting Company, which bought barley by a bushel
of 48 pounds for the purpose of making malt that was sold by
bushel of 34 pounds. The process of manufacture produced about
15 per cent. more of malt by the bushel than the barley measure of
the raw product. This increase was added to the inventory and
credited to surplus to be used as a basis for quarterly dividends
to the preferred stockholders. In his opinion, Justice Clarke said:
“. . .Of course, this increase has a value as it is sold as malt at malt prices.
For the purpose of inventory, the company has ascribed to it the value of the
barley. This, plaintiffs claim, is error, because that amount has already once
been charged to the malt account, and they say that this increase should have
no value ascribed to it until sold and delivered, when its proceeds go into the
books as cash. But it certainly is an asset of the company, and as an asset at
inventory periods, or when it is necessary to ascertain the actual condition of
the company, it must be valued in some way. As it has always been the custom
in the malting business to treat it as treated by this company, I am unwilling
to disregard that custom ...”

In Splittgerber Brothers v. Skinner Packing Company (1930)
228 S. W. 531, the defendant corporation having learned that real
estate which cost $98,661.67 was valued at $372,779.55 by an
appraisal company, added the increase to the asset account, cred
ited it to surplus and declared dividends from such surplus. The
increase in value was approved by the lower court. Although
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the upper court reversed the decision on other grounds it appar
ently considered the surplus based upon the revaluation to be a
legitimate source of dividends if the appraisal was bona fide.
District Judge Raper approvingly quoted 14 Corpus Juris 804
in the following words:
“ If the assets of a corporation are valued honestly and fairly in view of all
the facts known at the time of the declaration, a dividend is not rendered un
lawful by the fact that such assets subsequently prove to be worth less than
the valuation placed upon them.”

In Privat v. Grand Bay Land Company (1919) 41 S. D. 494, the
defendant corporation was organized in South Dakota for the
purpose of buying and selling land in Alabama. It purchased
large tracts, cut them up into small tracts and sold them to people
in the north. The company claimed the right to declare dividends
when its assets exceeded its liabilities, and in estimating its assets
it included unsold lands at market value on the dividend date,
regardless of the cost price. In an action against the corpora
tion to recover dividends paid from such unrealized appreciation,
the lower court gave judgment for the defendant and this was
affirmed by the supreme court of South Dakota.
Since a stock dividend takes nothing from the business, the
legal objection to cash dividends from unrealized appreciation
does not apply to it. Berwind-White Mining Company v. Ewart
(1895) 32 N. Y. S. 716, involved a suit by a stockholder to enjoin
a stock dividend which apparently was based upon unrealized
appreciation. The court refused to grant the requested injunc
tion. In McGinnis v. O'Connor (1909) 72 A. 614, the stockhold
ers of a corporation having a capital stock of $15,000 agreed that
the plant and goodwill were worth at least $25,000. In a dictum,
Justice Worthington stated that the increase of $10,000 could be
treated as profits for the basis of a stock dividend in the reorganiza
tion of the company.
In Northern Bank and Trust Company v. Day (1915) 83 Wash.
296, the Standard Fish Company paid $22,500 for a boat and
entered it on the books at $15,000. Later it was decided to raise
the book value of the asset to $20,000 to create a $5,000 surplus
which was added to an earned surplus of $10,000 and this amount
was made the basis of a $15,000 stock dividend. In an action by
the trustee in bankruptcy against a stockholder to recover the
dividends paid, the court decided in favor of the defendant.
State v. Bray (1929) 20 S. W. (2d) 56, is a case in which the de
fendant corporation increased its capitalization and paid a large
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stock dividend based upon appreciation of real estate and other
fixed assets. In an action against the corporation by the state of
Missouri to declare the charter forfeited on the ground of an
illegal issue of stock, the defendant was able to prove that the
appreciated value of the assets in question was not greater than
the replacement value and thereby won the case.
Stock dividends from unrealized appreciation of assets are ex
pressly authorized by the uniform business corporation act which
has been adopted by Ohio and Idaho. The reasoning of the Ohio
State Bar Association committee on corporation law on this
point follows:
“ A corporation should never write up its assets on account of some fancied
or estimated unrealized appreciation in value of assets in order to clear a defi
cit from its balance-sheet or to create a surplus to enable it to pay dividends
for the reason that shareholders and the public may thereby be misled, but if
such action is taken in the open and an honest redetermination of the value to
the corporation of its assets is made in the manner in which a determination of
such value would be made if shares were being issued for considerations other
than cash, no one can possibly be injured for the reason that an equivalent
result could be accomplished by the organization of a new corporation and the
sale of entire assets to such new corporation.”

Alabama also has a statute which makes this class of appreciation
available for stock dividends. According to section 6991 of the
1923 code:
“ Before the board of directors of any corporation shall be authorized to de
clare any such stock dividends, other than on a surplus of money, it shall order
the appraisal of all tangible assets of the corporation by a competent appraiser
or appraisers.”

New York, Vermont, and Wisconsin, the other states that have
statutes explicit enough to include or exclude appreciation, make
unrealized appreciation a legitimate basis for stock dividend
purposes.
So far as I have been able to ascertain, there is no American
decision which sanctions the offsetting of depreciation by apprecia
tion. However, there is an English case which has been cited as
authority for such action. In Ammonia Soda Company v. Cham
berlain (1918) 1 Ch. 266, the corporation owned soda beds which
were becoming exhausted as a result of the company’s operations.
A depletion reserve account was kept and the books showed a
deficit. The soda beds were found to be richer than originally
had been suspected. The directors reduced the depletion reserve
in order to eliminate the deficit and then declared dividends from
subsequent earnings. In an action against the directors, the court
held that they were not liable for the distribution of such divi
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dends because the English law did not require the setting aside of
a depletion reserve. The court also said that there was no rule
of law which prohibited a corporation from setting off apprecia
tion in the value of its capital assets, as determined by an honest
valuation, against losses in revenue. This case involves an in
crease in value due to the discovery of new assets rather than an
appreciation in the market value of the same assets. It is doubt
ful whether this decision is authority for offsetting depreciation in
the value of certain assets by appreciation in the value of other
property because depletion rather than depreciation is concerned.
Statutes directly or indirectly involving appreciation may be
divided into two groups: the general dividend statutes and the
statutes explicitly mentioning appreciation. The general divi
dend statutes may be classified as the balance-sheet group and
the surplus-profits group. In the jurisdictions having the firstmentioned type of legislation, dividends may be declared only
when the assets exceed the liabilities and the capital stock. In
these states, by implication, dividends may be based upon ap
preciation of assets. The only legitimate source of dividends in
the second group of states is surplus profits. Consequently, these
states do not permit the declaration of dividends from apprecia
tion unless that appreciation comes within the classification of
surplus profits.
Two states have statutes which take a definite stand on the
availability of unrealized appreciation for the purpose of cash
dividends. The Wisconsin statutes (1925) 182:19 read as fol
lows:
“Any corporation which has invested or may invest its net earnings or in
come or any part thereof in permanent additions to its property or whose
property shall have increased in value, may lawfully declare a dividend payable
to stockholders upon its capital either in money or in stock to the extent of the
net earnings or income so invested or of the said increase in the value of its
property; but the total amount of such dividend shall not exceed the actual
cash value of the assets owned by the corporation in excess of its total liabilities,
including its capital stock.”

According to 112 Laws of Ohio (1927) Sec. 8623:
“ No corporation shall pay dividends in cash or property, except from the
surplus of the aggregate of its assets over the aggregate of its liabilities, plus
stated capital, after deducting from such aggregate of its assets the amount
by which such aggregate was increased by unrealized appreciation in value or
revaluation of fixed assets; ...”

Thus, we see that Wisconsin expressly permits cash dividends from
unrealized appreciation of assets for dividend purposes while
Ohio clearly prohibits such dividends.
36
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To summarize—the courts are agreed that realized apprecia
tion of corporate assets is available for dividend purposes, but
most jurists have held that unrealized appreciation may not be
distributed to stockholders in the form of cash dividends. There
are a few decisions which apparently are contrary to the general
rule but these were decided so as to conform to recognized trade
practices or to take cognizance of some circumstance peculiar to
the particular case. Stock dividends from unrealized apprecia
tion are expressly legalized by statute in six states and the general
dividend statutes of the other jurisdictions probably legalize such
dividends by implication. No American decision permits a
corporation to offset depreciation by appreciation. The general
dividend statutes do not expressly permit cash dividends from
appreciation, but it has been said that some of them do so by im
plication. Wisconsin has a statute which expressly permits cash
dividends from unrealized appreciation, while Ohio has a statute
which expressly prohibits such dividends.
In closing, it may be said that the general trend of the statutes
and the common law in regard to appreciation is to conform to con
servative accounting practice by prohibiting cash dividends from
unrealized appreciation in the value of corporate assets and by
allowing stock dividends to be based upon such appreciation.
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